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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : 
v. : 
FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS, : Case No. 900471 
Priority No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question posed by the State for this Court's review is 
"whether the court of appeals erroneously held that State v. 
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a 'strict compliance' 
test with rule 11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
supersedes the 'record as a whole' test traditionally applied on 
review to determine whether a guilty plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily entered." Petition at 1. 
Additional questions to be considered in the event that 
this Court grants the State's petition are presented in Mr. Pharris' 
conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, filed separately today. 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals' decision, State v. Pharris, 14143 
Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is included in Appendix 1 to 
this brief. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court of Appeals7 opinion was filed on September 14, 
1990. No petition for rehearing was filed. The State's petition 
for certiorari was filed on October 15, 1990. This Court's 
jurisdiction is provided by Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Pharris entered a plea of guilty to retail theft, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 
76-6-602(1), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, 
presiding (T. 5). The trial court subsequently allowed Mr. Pharris 
to withdraw the plea, but then reimposed the plea on the day of 
trial (T. 11-12). Defense counsel moved to withdraw the reimposed 
plea, and the trial court denied the motion (T. 20). 
Mr. Pharris appealed the conviction and sentence to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, raising several issues. The Court of Appeals 
reversed Mr. Pharris' conviction, reaching only one of the issues 
raised, relating to the trial court's failure to comply with Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Mr. Pharris' guilty 
plea. Pharris at 35. Noting that during the entry of the guilty 
plea, the trial court had failed to review on the record three of 
the Rule 11 requirements (waiver of right against self-
incrimination, understanding of nature and elements of offense, 
knowledge of potential punishment), the Court of Appeals remanded 
the case to the trial court for withdrawal of the plea. Id. at 
37-38. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relating to Mr. Pharris' conviction are 
adequately presented in the Court of Appeals' decision. 143 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
REASONS FOR DENYING THE STATE'S PETITION 
This Court should not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction 
in this case, because the Court of Appeals7 decision is consistent 
with the decisions of this Court. This Court has previously denied 
a petition for a writ of certiorari on the issue raised in the 
instant petition, and has previously condoned the reasoning of the 
Pharris court in a per curiam opinion. 
In Pharris, the Court of Appeals carefully detailed the 
case law on the entry of guilty pleas, concluding that plea hearings 
after this Court#s decision in State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), would be evaluated under a test requiring strict compliance 
with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5). Pharris at 36-37. 
Although the State argues to the contrary, see Petition at 
4-9, the conclusion of the Pharris court is correct. Plea hearings 
prior to State v. Gibbons are evaluated under the "record as a 
whole" test, while plea hearings after Gibbons are evaluated under 
the strict compliance test.1 
1
 Gibbons was filed on June 30, 1987. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987). Pre-Gibbons "record as a whole" cases include State v. 
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah Ct. App.)(plea entered 
February 17, 1984), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); 
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989)(pleas at issue were 
entered prior to previous appeal filed in 1986, State v. Jolivet, 
(continued) 
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The State quotes language from State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294 
(Utah 1986), in which this Court voiced a concern that a strict 
compliance test for entry of guilty pleas might result in the 
withdrawal of numerous pleas in cases too old to be reprosecuted. 
Petition at 7-8. This concern is no longer relevant. As the State 
argued and this Court ruled in State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1989)(per curiam), the strict compliance test is not applied 
retroactively. Hickman at 672 n.l.2 
(footnote 1 continued) 
712 P.2d 843, 843-844 (Utah 1986)); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266, 1267 (Utah 1988)(plea entered July 28, 1986); State v. 
Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 671 (Utah 1989)(pleas entered in January of 
1985). Post-Gibbons strict compliance cases include State v. 
Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(according to 
pages 2 and 3 of Mr. Pharris' opening brief, the pleas were entered 
on August 8 and August 9 of 1989); State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26, 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(plea entered January 25, 1989); 
State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989)(according to page 1 of 
Mr. Smith's opening brief, the plea was entered on September 15, 
1987); and State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)(plea entered July 17, 1987). 
2
 In Hickman, the State argued, 
Defendant cites State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987), for the proposition that the trial 
judge was required to question defendant on the 
record about promises or threats. Gibbons was 
decided three years after defendant pled guilty. 
Prior to Gibbons, this Court had always applied 
the Brooks-Warner record as a whole test. This 
Court should adopt the position taken by the 
Court of Appeals in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 
P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rehearing denied, 
91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1988), cert, denied, 98 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988); that Gibbons represents 
a clear break with the past in application of a 
procedural rule and that it will not be 
retroactively applied. 
State's brief in Case No. 880362, at 7. 
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The relevant policy considerations supporting the Court of 
Appeals' consistent application of the strict compliance test in 
post-Gibbons cases are those first articulated in Gibbons: the 
application of the strict compliance test will protect the 
constitutional rights at stake in plea hearings, and will discourage 
or expedite postconviction attacks on the pleas, by establishing a 
clear appellate record demonstrating the propriety of the plea. 740 
P.2d at 1314. 
This Court has previously denied certiorari review of the 
Court of Appeals' first interpretation of the Gibbons strict 
compliance test in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. 
App., cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).3 Since that time, 
the law has been applied consistently, as it was in the instant case, 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Pharris requests that this Court deny the State's 
petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this 3DTL day of October, 1990. 
s. 
JAMp A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Mr. Pharris 
3
 The State contested the accuracy of the Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of Gibbons on pages 14 through 18 of its 
petition for certiorari in State v. Vasilacopulos. and on page 4 of 
its reply to the brief in opposition in that case. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that ten copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this 3DtH day of October, 1990. 
DELIVERED by 
October, 1990. 
this of 
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APPENDIX 1 
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION 
143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Frank Edward PHARRIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890549-CA 
FILED: September 14, 1990 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
ATTORNEYS: 
James A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Newey.1 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Frank Edward Pharris appeals 
his conviction of retail theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-602(1) (1989), We vacate the conviction 
and remand. 
Defendant was accused of taking a VCR 
from a Sears store without paying for it. 
Police arrested defendant in the store parking 
lot with the VCR in his possession. 
Defendant's trial was set for August 8, 
1989. On the day of trial, defendant agreed to 
snter a guilty plea if the State would not 
appose a motion that defendant be sentenced 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
U2(l)(c) (1989), for a class A misdemeanor. 
At the change of plea hearing, the trial 
udge asked defendant whether he had gone 
>ver his statement with his attorney, whether 
le was under the influence of • drugs or 
tlcohol, whether he understood the English 
anguage, whether he was threatened or pro-
nised anything other than the plea bargain 
tself, and whether he was acting freely and of 
lis own volition. 
The judge then told defendant he was enti-
led to certain constitutional protections incl-
ding the right to trial by a jury, the right to 
onfront and cross-examine witnesses, the 
ight to require the State to prove its case 
eyond a reasonable doubt, and "other valu-
ble constitutional rights." Defendant said he 
nderstood his waiver of those rights by pie-
ding guilty and was willing to do so. 
The judge asked defendant if he had any 
uestions of the court or of his attorney, 
efendant resr>onded_ "No " Thp inHap acl^ri 
naa aiscussea tnose penalties with him. Defe-
ndant answered, "Yes." The judge told defe-
ndant the court was not bound by the reco-
mmendations of the plea bargain and the 
court could impose any sentence either conc-
urrently or consecutively with the sentence 
defendant was presently serving. 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty which the 
judge declared was entered voluntarily and 
knowingly. Defendant waived the two-day 
minimum time for sentencing and asked to be 
sentenced immediately. Defense counsel asked 
the court to impose sentence as a class A 
misdemeanor. The prosecutor did not oppose 
defense counsel's request but described defe-
ndant's extensive criminal record. The judge 
denied defendant's motion to reduce the 
offense one degree and sentenced defendant to 
serve zero to five years concurrently with the 
sentence he was presently serving. 
Defendant immediately moved to withdraw 
his guilty plea and asked to proceed to trial. 
Defense counsel , argued that unless his client 
received some concession in the sentence, it 
would be a disservice to him not to go to trial. 
The judge granted the motion and set trial for 
the next day. 
The next morning, the judge reversed his 
decision granting the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea, explaining that a showing of 
"good cause" was required. The judge then 
gave defendant an opportunity to show good 
cause as to why his plea should be withdrawn. 
In response, defense counsel explained the 
State had not opposed the reduction of defe-
ndant's sentence to a class A misdemeanor. 
He pointed to the length of time defendant 
had been incarcerated since his arrest and the 
circumstances surrounding defendant's release 
on another conviction and his subsequent 
arrest. Defense counsel also mentioned that he 
had ineffectively represented defendant by 
indicating that the plea bargain had a good 
chance of success. In response, the prosecutor 
again outlined portions of defendant's prior 
criminal record. 
The judge noted he had informed defendant 
before the guilty plea was entered that the 
recommendations as to the sentence were not 
binding on the court and defendant's disap-
pointment with the sentence did not establish 
good cause for withdrawal of the plea. The 
judge ultimately reimposed the sentence. 
Among other claims on appeal,2 defendant 
asserts the trial judge failed to comply with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Proc-
edure as required by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), when accepting his guilty plea. Defen-
dant contends the trial court failed to inform 
him of (1) his right against self-
incrimination; (2) the nature and elements of 
does not contend the trial court's questioning 
of defendant complies with the Gibbons strict 
compliance test, but rather responds that 
appellate court decisions subsequent to Gibbons 
have abandoned the strict compliance 
standard and allow application of the prior 
"record as a whole" test to determine whether 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered 
his guilty plea. The State further asserts that, 
at the hearing before the trial judge, defendant 
did not articulate as a ground for withdrawal 
of his plea that the court failed to comply with 
Rule 11 and thus defendant cannot raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
RULE 11 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure sets out findings a court must make 
before accepting a guilty plea. Rule 11(5) 
provides, in pertinent part: 
The court may refuse to accept a 
~i<»o ^f miilrv nr no contest, and 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial, and to 
confront and cross-examine in 
open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea 
he waives all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense 
to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elem-
ents; 
(e) the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence 
that may be imposed upon him for 
each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sent-
ences; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5). 
Prior to 1987, the Utah Supreme Court d 
not require strict compliance with Rule 1 
The court had concluded that a guilty pi 
may be upheld if "the record as a whole af 
rmatively establishes that defendant enter 
his plea with full knowledge and understa 
ding of its consequences." Warner v. Mori 
709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985) (mem.); see a\ 
Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 3 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). This "record as 
whole" test was later reaffirmed in State 
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (j 
curiam). 
In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court reject 
the "record as a whole" test. In State 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Ut 
Supreme Court announced that strict comj 
ance was required under Rule 11(5) of f 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when d 
endants entered guilty pleas. Id. at 1314. In G 
bons, the trial judge, in accepti 
Gibbons' _ guilty plea, informed him of I 
penalties for the crimes, the constitutioi 
rights he waived as articulated in Rule 11, t 
possible sentences for the crimes, and t 
possibility that those sentences could i 
concurrently or consecutively. Id. at 13 
However, the trial judge failed to info 
Gibbons of the elements of the crimes. Id. 1 
Utah Supreme Court remanded Gibbo 
appeal of his guilty plea because he had i 
filed a motion to withdraw his plea, then 
depriving the trial court of the opportunity 
address the error, but articulated its cone 
that the plea was not properly taken as de 
ndant had not been adequately informed 
CONSIDERING VOLUNTARINESS OF 
GUILTY PLEA FOR FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals have allowed a Rule 11 
challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be 
considered for the first time on appeal. "[I]n 
certain cases we may consider the failure to 
comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error 
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be 
first raised on appeal to this court." State v. 
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (per curiam).3 See also State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (defendant 
had not moved to withdraw guilty plea and 
court remanded to the trial court to allow a 
withdrawal motion while retaining jurisdiction 
over the case). 
The Valencia court relied on the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), where the 
Court found no error when the Alabama 
Supreme Court, on its own motion, dealt with 
the constitutionality of a guilty plea. Id. at 
240. The Court stated that "[i]t was error, 
plain on the "face of the record, for the trial 
judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without 
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent 
and voluntary. Id. at242.4 .
 % . 
uiAlthough we acknowledge that the trial 
jucige made a greater effort to ensure that 
defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowi-
ngly given than in Valencia and Boykin', 
because of the fundamental rights involved, 
we conclude the trial court's deficiencies in 
determining whether the guilty plea was 
entered knowingly and voluntarily constitute 
plain error.5 We therefore will address this 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
M*V wppuiiuuny to articulate the requirements 
for accepting guilty pleas. The court noted the 
trial court's burden to comply with the Rule 
11 requirements: 
Because of the importance of 
compliance with Rule 11(e) [new 
Rule 11(5)] and Boykin, the law 
places the burden of establishing 
compliance with those requirements 
on the trial judge. It is not suffic-
ient to assume that defense attor-
neys make sure that their clients 
fully understand the contents of the 
affidavit. 
The use of a sufficient affidavit 
can promote efficiency, but\.an 
affidavit should be only a starting 
point, not an end point, in the 
pleading process. 
rd. at 1313.' 
The court found that a "sufficient affidavit" 
>hould contain the following elements: (1) a 
ist of the names and the degrees of the crimes 
:harged; (2) a statement of the elements of the 
>ffenses; (3) a synopsis of the defendant's acts 
hat establish the elements of the crimes 
harged; (4) the allowable punishment for the 
rimes charged and note the possibility of 
onsecutive sentences for multiple crimes; (5) 
be rights waived by the entry of a guilty plea; 
5) the details of any plea bargain with a dis-
laimer that any sentencing recommendations 
lay not be followed; (7) the defendant's 
bility to read and understand the English 
mguage; (8) the defendant's competency; and 
>) the absence of any inducements to influ-
ice defendant's plea. Id. at 1313-14. The 
)urt concluded that "[t]he trial judge should 
\en review the statements in the affidavit with 
\e defendant, question the defendant conce-
ding his understanding of it, and fulfill the 
her requirements imposed by [Rule 11] on 
e record before accepting the guilty plea." Id. 
1314 (emphasis added). 
The Gibbons standard was acknowledged by 
is court in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 765 
2d 1278 (Utah 1988), where we reiterated 
* rule that: 
[tjrial courts may not rely on 
defense counsel or executed affid-
avits to satisfy the specific require-
ments of Rule 11(e). [Gibbons, 740 
P.2d] at 1313. Rather, with or 
without an affidavit or defense 
counsel's advice, the trial court 
must conduct an on-the-record 
review with defendant of the Rule 
11(e) requirements. 
silacopulos, 756 P.2d at 94 (quoting Gib-
is, 740 P.2d at 1314)). However, in 
applied the previous "record as a whole" test. 
Recently in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we clearly held 
that the Gibbons strict compliance test is 
controlling. Id. at 28. 
Other opinions have likewise stated the test 
for determining whether Rule 11 has been 
followed is the strict compliance test articul-
ated in Gibbons. See State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 
464, 465 (Utah 1989)6; State v. Valencia, 776 
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per 
curiam)7. 
The State relies on Jolivet v. Cook, 784 
P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 
S. Ct. 751 (1990),* and State v. Copeland, 765 
P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988),* to support its 
argument that the Utah Supreme Court has 
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test. 
However, we assume that the court applied the 
"record'as a whole" test in these cases because 
the guilty pleas in both cases were entered 
before the Gibbons decision.10 
The State also argues that this court has 
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test 'as 
well in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). However, Thurston is not on 
point and the State is mistaken in its reliance 
on this case. In Thurston, the defendant 
argued the State had not kept its part of the 
plea agreement as to the recommendation that 
defendant receive probation and thus defen-
dant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea because of this failure. Id. at 1301. The 
issue was not whether the trial court failed to 
comply with Rule 11 in determining whether 
the plea was knowing and voluntary. As the 
court explained: 
The record here establishes that 
defendant was fully informed of his 
rights and the consequences of his 
guilty plea. 
The judge, pursuant to Rule 11, 
informed defendant of his rights to 
t r i a l a n d a g a i n s t s e l f -
incrimination, and related to him 
the potential consequences of his 
guilty plea. 
Id. at 1302. 
In summary, we find the Gibbons strict 
compliance test is applicable to this post-
Gibbons guilty plea. In reviewing the trial 
court's inquiry into the voluntariness of def-
endant's plea, we find the trial judge did not 
review with the defendant in court on the 
record three of the requirements of Rule 11. 
First, the trial court did not as required by 
Rule ll(5)(c) inform defendant at the time the 
plea was taken that he waived his constituti-
onal right against self-incrimination by ple-
ading guilty to the offense. The State argues 
that this information is included in the affid-
Next, the trial court maae no inquiry on wc 
record concerning defendant's understanding 
of the nature and elements of the offense as 
required by Rule ll(5)(d). The State argues 
that the nature and elements of the offense of 
retail theft were explained at defendant's 
preliminary hearing. However, the preliminary 
hearing transcript is not before us and thus it 
is impossible for us to make this determina-
tion. Again, this information is only in the 
affidavit and, as we have explained, that alone 
is insufficient. Failure to inform a defendant 
of the nature and elements of the offense is 
fatal to a guilty plea conviction. See Gibbons, 
740 P.2d at 1314." See also Valencia, 776 
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Finally, the trial court failed to review the 
possible punishment with defendant as requ-
ired by Rule ll(5)(e). The record reflects the 
following dialogue between the defendant and 
the trial court on the issue of penalties: 
Q [THE COURT]: Are you aware of the 
possible penalties that can be imposed for a 
Third Degree Felony? Has your attorney told 
you what the possible penalties are? 
A [DEFENDANT]: Yes. 
Utah courts have found the failure to 
inform a defendant of the punishments poss-
ible is fatal to a guilty plea conviction.12 See 
Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (court 
reversed because record did not show defen-
dant was informed of the minimum manda-
tory sentence which would be imposed); Vas-
ilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 95 (in a pre-Oibbons 
plea, the court reversed after finding the def-
endant did not understand the possibility of 
consecutive sentences).13 
Under the Gibbons strict compliance test, 
before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court 
must review on the record with the defendant 
at the time the plea is taken the nature and 
elements of the offense, the constitutional 
rights articulated in Rule 11 which he waives 
by pleading guilty, and the allowable penalties. 
We find that the trial court failed to strictly 
"comply with Rule 11 and Gibbons and thus we 
vacate defendant's conviction and remand to 
the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
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1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (1990). 
2. Defendant also claims that (1) the prosecutor 
failed to comply with the plea agreement; (2) the 
court erred in reversing its prior order granting 
withdrawal of the plea; (3) there was "good cause" 
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3. In Valencia, the defendant was asked two quest-
ions at the time the guilty plea was entered: (1) 
whether defendant "understood his affidavit;" and 
(2) whether his plea was "voluntary." Valencia, 116 
P.2d at 1334. The court found that the guilty plea 
was not entered in compliance with Rule 11(5) or 
with Gibbons and summarily reversed and remanded 
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and 
proceed to trial. Valencia, 116 P.2d at 1334. 
4. In Boykin, there was no dialogue in the record 
between the defendant and the trial judge as to the 
voluntariness of the guilty plea, Boykin, 395 U.S. at 
239, and the United States Supreme Court therefore 
concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights 
had been violated. Id. at 243. 
5. The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated a two-
part test for determining plain error. Sfafe v. Eldr-
edge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 
5. Ct. 62 (1989). First, the error must be "plain," 
which means "from our examination of the record, 
we must be able to say that it should have been 
obvious to the trial court that it was committing 
error." Id. at 35. Second, the error "must affect the 
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error 
be harmful." Id. See also State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 
1336, 1341 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The defendant's guilty plea in this case was 
entered after the Gibbons case was decided. There-
fore, it should have been obvious to the trial judge 
that strict compliance with Rule 11 was required. In 
addition, defendant's substantial constitutional 
rights were affected by this failure to strictly comply 
with Rule 11. 
6. In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court allowed the 
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea because the trial 
judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11. Smith, 
111 P.2d at 465. The court ruled that the test for 
complying with Rule 11 is the strict compliance t^st 
articulated in Gibbons. Id. The court then found 
that neither the plea bargain affidavit nor the trial 
judge clearly communicated that defendant would 
be required to serve a minimum mandatory sentence 
of five years. Id. 
7. In Valencia, the defendant entered his guilty plea 
after the Gibbons decision. The trial judge failed to 
review the contents of the affidavit with the defen-
dant. Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335. The court concl-
uded that the affidavit alone could not "serve as z 
mere substitute for the full and complete review or 
the record by the trial court that is required by th< 
rule. * Id. Since the trial judge failed to comply wit} 
Rule 11, the court remanded to the trial court t< 
allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. • 
8. In J olivet, the Utah Supreme Court applied th< 
"record as a whole" test to Jolivet's motion to wit 
hdraw a guilty plea. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149 
While the court does not give the date Jolive 
entered his guilty plea or address the fact that th 
guilty plea had been entered prior to Gibbons, th 
Jolivet decision was the second appeal by the defc 
ndant, who had entered his guilty plea prior to th 
first appeal decided in 1986, before the decision i 
Gibbons. See State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Uta 
1986). 
9. In Copeland, the defendant argued that the tri; 
court failed to explain the nature and elements c 
the offense. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273. The cou 
examined the record and found that the trial cou 
jjt use the preferred method of having 
defendant state in his o*n words his understanding 
T the offense and the actions which make him 
lilty of the crime," id., the court found that the 
ements of the offense were clearly explained to 
tfendant at the time of his arraignment and, ther-
ore, under the "record as a whole" test, the plea 
as voluntary. Id. Once again, however, Copeland 
tered his guilty plea before Gibbons was decided 
id although the court did not articulate this as a 
ason for applying the "record as a whole" test, we 
sume this to be the case. 
. Utah courts have refused to apply the Gibbons 
ict compliance test to pve-Gibbons guilty pleas. 
State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. 
Dp. 1988), this court ruled that the Gibbons test 
i not apply since Vasilacopulos entered his guilty 
:a in 1984 before the Gibbons case was decided. Id. 
94. The court ruled that since the Gibbons 
;t was a "clear break with the past," it would not 
applied retroactively. Id. See also State v. 
ckman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah 1989) (per 
riam). 
. The Gibbons court relied on McCarthy y. 
iked States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), where the 
lited States Supreme Court stated that the factual 
ments of the charges must be explained so the 
fendant understands those elements. Id. at 466. 
e Court concluded that "[tjhere is no adequate 
Dstitute for demonstrating in the record at the 
je the plea is entered the defendant's understan-
ig of the nature of the charge against him." Id. 
The State argues the affidavit is sufficient to 
prise defendant of the allowable sentence, 
nwever, the affidavit signed by the defendant 
ed "Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5" under the notation 
"Crime, Degree, and Punishment," but the affi-
/it did not include the term "years" following "0-
The Gibbons court stated that a judge may not 
\ an affidavit to establish compliance with Rule 
It is not sufficient to assume that 
defense attorneys make sure that their 
clients fully understand the contents of 
the affidavit. 
The use of a sufficient affidavit can 
promote efficiency, but an affidavit 
should be only a starting point, not an 
end point, in the pleading process. 
ibons, 740 P.2d at 1313. 
The Utah Supreme Court's most recent opinion 
this Gibbons issue is somewhat ambiguous. In 
te v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), the court 
nd that neither the affidavit nor the trial court 
irly explained the possibility of a minimum 
ndatory sentence to the defendant. Id. at 465. 
t court concluded: "In order for defendant's 
Ity plea to be valid and in compliance with rule 
s)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
I State v. Gibbons, the record must show that he 
; unequivocably and clearly informed about the 
tence that would be imposed. Such evidence does 
exist either in the affidavit regarding the plea 
gain or in the transcript of the guilty plea. Thus, 
: 11(e) and State v. Gibbons require the vacating 
defendant's cuiltv Dlea on the eround that it was 
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PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on appel-
lant's motion for summary reversal for man-
ifest error, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10. 
In response, appellee filed a motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs motion for summary disposition, 
but did not file a response addressing the 
merits of appellant's motion. 
We first consider appellee's motion to 
dismiss appellant's motion. Appellee contends 
that the motion was untimely based on Rule 
10's requirement that a motion for summary 
disposition be filed within 10 days after the 
docketing statement is served. Appellant's 
docketing statement was served on July 9, 
1990, and her motion for summary disposition 
was filed on July 23, 1990. Appellant contends 
that because she served the docketing state-
ment by mail, she was entitled to an additional 
three days after service of the docketing stat-
ement in which to file a motion for summary 
reversal. See Utah R. App. P. 22(d). Although 
this three-day mailing rule is usually applied 
when the receiving party is required or perm-
itted to act after receipt of the document, it 
does not specifically exclude the present situ-
ation. It is unnecessary to rely upon the 
mailing rule, however, since Utah R. App. P. 
2 provides this court with the flexibility to 
suspend the requirements of Rule 10, on its 
own motion, where asuspension is "[i]n the 
interest of expediting a decision." Because we 
conclude that the motion is clearly meritorious 
